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FIDELITY BONDS AND THE RESTATEMENT
HUGH E. REYNOLDS, JR.*
JAMES DIMos**
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the portions of the cur-
rent draft of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Suretyship that
may relate to fidelity bonds.1 A wide variety of fidelity bonds are
issued by companies that routinely provide such contracts for a.
premium. In general, these contracts are designed to provide the
obligee with some guaranty or protection against losses arising out
of the dishonesty or lack of faithful performance of certain individ-
uals or groups of individuals. They tend to fall into one of four
categories: public official bonds, financial institution bonds, com-
mercial fidelity coverages, and fiduciary bonds on court-supervised
fiduciaries.2 Tradition often shapes the reality of the practice of
law. The field described as "fidelity and surety law" has developed
many such traditions. For example, the relegation of bonds on
court-supervised fiduciaries as "miscellaneous bonds" -is part of
that tradition.3 It is reasonable to ask why the phrase "fidelity and
surety," often spoken as if one word, was chosen to describe this
specialty practice. The most probable reason is that the companies,
hence the clients, that write surety bonds also generally write fidel-
* Partner, Locke, Reynolds, Boyd & Weisell, Indianapolis, Indiana. B.S., University of
Notre Dame, 1950; J.D., University of Michigan, 1953. Member, Board of Advisers, Restate-
ment (Third) of Suretyship.
** Associate, Locke, Reynolds, Boyd & Weisell, Indianapolis, Indiana. A.B., Wabash Col-
lege, 1983; J.D., Washington University, 1986.
1. For the purposes of this paper, the terms "fidelity bonds," "fidelity coverages," "fidel-
ity insurance," and "instruments of fidelity" refer to one or more of a variety of contracts
issued by corporations in the business of issuing such contracts for premiums.
2. By agreement with another author in this Symposium, bonds on court-supervised fidu-
ciaries will be discussed in another article. Traditionally such court bonds are considered
"miscellaneous bonds." See James A. Black, Jr., Miscellaneous Surety Bonds and the Re-
statement, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1195, 1198 (1993).
3. See id.
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ity bonds. Furthermore, all such coverages involve at least one as-
pect of the law of suretyship: in each case the corporate surety or
issuer of the fidelity bond is contractually obligated to respond
should another default either in performance of a contract or in
fulfilling obligations imposed by statute.4
The traditional view is that the "surety" of "fidelity and surety"
refers to instruments in which the surety agrees to guarantee the
performance of a written contract.' The overwhelming bulk of such
bonds is issued in connection with construction contracts,6 but
there are many others. The common thread among "fidelity"
bonds is that the issuer of the bond or coverage is required to re-
spond should a loss result from a lack of fidelity on the part of the
principal obligor.
Many contracts with fidelity coverage are, in fact, insurance poli-
cies.8 These policies provide a variety of coverages to the insured of
which the fidelity coverage is only a part. Some, but not all, of such
fidelity coverages are triggered by the dishonesty of the covered
individual.9 However, there are instruments, particularly public of-
ficial bonds, in which the failure to perform faithfully the duties of
an office will trigger the surety's obligation even though the motive
was an honest one or the cause of the loss was merely negligence or
oversight.10
Any reasonably thorough search for case citations and authori-
ties in the field of fidelity and surety law will reveal thousands of
cases on a variety of subjects. It is fair to say that an examination
4. See, e.g., Patrick E. Hartigan & Julie F. Yanda, Employee Dishonesty Claims, in
HANDLING FIDELITY, SURETY, AND FINANCIAL RISK CLAIMS § 3.1, § 3.1 (Robert F. Cushman et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HANDLING FIDELITY CLAIMS].
5. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz, 182 F.2d 752, 756 (8th Cir.
1950).
6. For a general discussion of bonds issued in connection with construction contracts, see
T. Scott Leo, The Construction Contract Surety and Some Suretyship Defenses, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1225 (1993).
7. Robert A. Babcock, History of Fidelity Coverage: Types of Fidelity Bonds, National
Institute of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, Committee on Fidelity and Surety
Law, American Bar Association 1, 4 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. See Erik N. Videlock & Abbe F. Fletman, Financial Institution Bonds, in HANDLING
FIDELITY CLAIMS, supra note 4, § 1.1, § 1.1.
9. See id. § 1.2 (discussing employee dishonesty).
10. See Frank B. Keech et al., Miscellaneous Bonds, in HANDLING FIDELITY CLAIMS, supra
note 4, § 10.1, § 10.9.
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of any substantial number of those cases will reveal no citation to
the current Restatement of Security." In the experience of this
practitioner, the 1941 Restatement of Security is completely ne-
glected in the resolution of policy, philosophical, or practical issues
in fidelity and surety coverages.
Yet, suretyship is a very significant field of law. It is a field that
requires analysis based on an understanding of the goals it seeks to
accomplish. It requires an organization and development of the
subject matter to assist practitioners and courts in reaching correct
and, often more important, predictable results. Thus, there is
clearly a need for a new Restatement of Suretyship. This Restate-
ment may cover a number of areas, but it must devote a principal
area to fidelity and surety bonds as described in this Article. Some
of the fidelity coverages offer interesting conceptual problems. The
text of the current version of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship does assist in determining what doctrines of traditional
suretyship law do and do not apply in such fidelity cases.
II. PUBLIC OFFICIAL BONDS
Public official bonds are bonds that cover either a named public
official or the office occupied by one or more public officials.'2
Some such bonds may be issued only for the benefit of the govern-
mental unit in which the principal holds office.' 3 However, often
such bonds provide coverage to the general public.'4 Normally such
a bond is required by statute and is often a prerequisite to the
official's taking office.'1 In many instances, if such a bond is can-
celled or terminated, or if it expires by its own terms without a
replacement bond, the public official is removed from office.' 6
To the extent the bond is a statutory bond, it incorporates faith-
ful performance of all statutory duties as obligations of the princi-
pal. 7 If the statute prescribes the text of the bond or indicates a
11. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY (1941).
12. Keech et al., supra note 10, §§ 10.1, 10.9.
13. See generally id. § 10.25; 63A AM. JuRa. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 540
(1984) [hereinafter Public Officers].
14. See generally Public Officers, supra note 13, § 545.
15. See Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.9.
16. See id. § 10.10.
17. Id. § 10.9.
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more limited exposure for the bond, then the terms of the bond are
governed by that text or that limited exposure. Comment d to sec-
tion 11 of the Restatement of Suretyship discusses statutory
bonds, stating that when the bond is required pursuant to a stat-
ute, "the terms of the statute may be relevant in determining the
meaning of the secondary obligation.""' In fact, in public official
bonds, the rule is much stronger; to the extent the statute bears on
the obligation undertaken in the bond, the statute controls. 9 Al-
though the text of the bond may provide limitations on the cover-
ages provided, such limitations are of no effect if they restrict the
statutory requirements.20
The second type of bond that may be issued is a blanket public
employee bond.2' An example of such a bond would be one issued
on all the employees of a county sheriffs department, or all the
employees of the office of a state's secretary of state. Such bonds
may be required by statute, but more often they are chosen to pro-
vide prudent protection to secure the governmental entity. To the
extent such bonds may be required by statute, the statutory terms
would be incorporated as part of the bond and could not be re-
stricted by the text of the bond.22
A. Do Public Official Bonds Have Suretyship Status?
Section 1 of the Restatement of Suretyship describes the three-
party surety relationship, discussing in turn the status of the "sec-
ondary obligor" or surety, the "principal obligor," and the "obli-
gee."' 23 For suretyship to exist, one person, the principal obligor,
must owe performance of a duty, the underlying obligation, to an-
other person, the obligee.2 4 The suretyship arrangement is com-
pleted when a third person, the secondary obligor, is subject to a
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 11 cmt. d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992) (emphasis
added).
19. See, e.g., State v. Lidster, 467 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
20. See Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.9.
21. See id. § 10.25.
22. See, e.g., Lidster, 467 N.E.2d at 49.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
24. Id. § 1(1)(a).
1252 [Vol. 34:1249
FIDELITY BONDS AND THE RESTATEMENT
"secondary obligation" to perform the underlying obligation pursu-
ant to a contract.25
The following are also features of a surety relationship: the sec-
ondary obligor owes performance of the duty of the principal obli-
gor to the obligee in the event the principal obligor fails to perform
the underlying obligation;26 if the underlying obligation is. per-
formed, the obligee is not entitled to performance of the secondary
obligation;27 and, as between the principal obligor and secondary
obligor, the principal obligor has the duty to perform the underly-
ing obligation or bear the cost- of performance. 8
The traditional public official bond is issued guaranteeing the
performance of either a named individual, a person occupying a
named office, a group of individuals stated by name, or a group of
offices stated by name. It has the standard three-party relationship
set forth in section 1 of the Restatement: the principal obligor is
the holder of the public office who owes performance of the duties
of that office (the underlying obligation) to the obligee, the govern-
ment entity of which that person is an officer; the secondary obli-
gor owes performance, in whole or in part, to cover losses caused
by a breach of the duty of the public official to the governmental
entity. These duties are set forth in the statutes and/or the text of
the bond,29 and normally this obligation of the public official is
characterized as a "faithful performance" of the duties of the of-
fice.30 Between the secondary obligor and the principal obligor, the
primary obligation to perform the duty is on the principal obligor,
the public official. The contract is usually formed by the execution
of an instrument in which the signatures of both the primary obli-
gor and the secondary obligor appear.3' Thus, it is clear that public
official bonds, which name as the principal obligor a public official
or the office he holds, are traditional instruments of suretyship.
25. Id. § 1(1)(b).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 1(1)(c).
28. Id.
29. Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.10 (noting that a bond with terms broader than the
statutory requirements may expand the obligation of the surety beyond statutory limits).
30. Id. § 10.9; see also Hugh E. Reynolds, Some Problems Peculiar to Public Official
Bonds, 2 FORUM 292, 292 (1969).
31. See generally Public Officers, supra note 13, § 494.
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Blanket public employee bonds, on the other hand, are normally
issued covering a large number of governmental employees.2 Dur-
ing the term of the bond, it would be expected that the make-up of
that group of potential "principal obligors" would change. Usually
the fidelity coverage in a public employee bond is triggered by dis-
honesty and does not include the broader "faithful performance"
obligation.3 Normally, the public employees covered by such a
bond are not signatories to the bond and have no direct relation-
ship with the issuer of the bond. 4 Thus, while a covered employee
may be aware of the existence of such a bond, this would be a for-
tuity. The key to whether such a bond is an instrument of surety-
ship lies in whether the principal obligor has the primary duty of
performance.
The current draft of the Restatement indicates that, given the
standard three-party relationship described above, the existence of
suretyship status is not dependent on whether the principal obligor
(the public employee) knows about the secondary obligation (the
blanket bond).3 Rather, the key question, which is determined by
the text of the bond, is the nature of the coverage. More often than
not, there is no statute prescribing or defining the obligation, thus
the coverage afforded is determined entirely by the terms of the
bond. 6 If coverage is triggered by the dishonesty of the employee
of the public entity, it would seem that not only is the breach of
duty that of the principal obligor, but that the secondary obligor
has a right to recover its loss on its bond from the dishonest
employee.37
However, if the bond includes "faithful performance" coverage,
simple negligence may trigger coverage under the bond." In such a
32. See Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.25.
33. See id. Some coverages may provide the broader "faithful performance" criteria but
usually the bond only covers "dishonesty."
34. Fidelity coverage has increasingly been provided through two-party contracts between
the "surety" and the "obligee." Babcock, supra note 7, at 2. As such, public official blanket
bonds are usually written for the benefit of a public officer to cover employees. Keech et al.,
supra note 10, § 10.25. As a result, the individual employees are not parties to the bond.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1(2)(d)-(e) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
36. See generally Public Officers, supra note 13, § 505.
37. This will be discussed more fully under the section on financial institution bonds. See
infra part III.
38. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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case, is the covered employee actually an insured who has the right
to look to the bond as though it were a liability insurance policy?
If this were so, it would seem, philosophically, that the very linch-
pin of the surety relationship has fallen because the primary obli-
gation in the event of loss to the obligee (or others protected under
such bond) has been assumed by the carrier (secondary obligor).
As a general principle of the law of suretyship, however, it would
appear that whether such an instrument should be regarded as a
surety instrument would depend on whether, with respect to the
covered act, the primary obligation remains with the public em-
ployee or has been assumed, as a form of insurance, by the issuer
of the bond.
The current Restatement clearly provides the key definitional
guideline for this particular problem: "[A]s between the principal
obligor and the secondary obligor, the principal obligor has a duty
to perform the underlying obligation or bear the cost of perform-
ance. 1 3 9 It is possible to write an insurance policy against negli-
gence under which the covered parties, including the public em-
ployee whose act or omission causes the actual loss, are fully
indemnified by the insurance carrier. This is not the general pur-
pose of public employee blanket bonds, though. To the extent that
a public employee blanket bond contains such coverage, no surety
relationship exists. If the agreement is truly in the form of a bond,
the risk implicit in proper performance of the duties of the public
employee (principal obligor) will not shift to the surety (secondary
obligor). In fact, the surety will rarely know of the nonperformance
of the duty until after the act or omission that gives rise to the
claim.
Thus, the employee, whether dishonest or negligent, still has the
primary obligation and, hence, the carrier is truly a secondary obli-
gor as defined in the Restatement. The secondary obligation is as-
sumed solely for purposes of indemnifying the obligee or third par-
ties against damage. As noted, a claim based on dishonesty
probably does not require any further analysis. Carriers, whether
they are sureties or insurance carriers, do not insure individuals
against those individuals' own dishonesty.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § l(1)(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
19931 1255
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
However, in the area of faithful performance where the act need
not be dishonest to be covered, it may be helpful to look at the
common law that would apply to the majority of such cases. Analy-
sis is helped by examining the obligations and assuming that no
such bond exists. If a member of the general public sues the gov-
ernment department that has caused damage, the department,
under traditional laws of respondeat superior, can in turn recover
against the employee whose negligent act caused the loss and,
hence, the liability of the department. Thus, the public employee
has an underlying obligation to the obligee whether the loss or
damage is caused by dishonesty or by incompetence.40
This simple analysis would seem to resolve our problem. Absent
express language in the bond indicating that it will provide insur-
ance for the individual employee whose act or omission causes loss
to the obligee, which loss is, in turn, recovered against the issuer of
the bond, the requirements of section 1(2)(d) of the Restatement
are met. The employee is the principal obligor and the carrier is
the secondary obligor. Put another way, unless the statute or text
of the bond makes the employee whose act causes the loss the
functional equivalent of an "additional insured," this essential ele-
ment of the surety relationship remains. More importantly, the
surety that pays the loss has a right to recoup its payment from
the employee whose act or omission causes the loss.41
It is important to remember that in many instances, the claims
on both blanket public employee bonds and individual public offi-
cial bonds are presented by members of the public. This does not
change the appropriateness of the definition; this situation is no
different from the very traditional and similar circumstances that
govern payment bonds issued on construction contracts. The text
of the instrument or statute widens the class of obligees from the
employer of the public official (be it the public entity or the head
of the department under which the covered employee works) so as
to include members of the general public who are injured as a re-
sult of the lack of faithful performance.
40. A further note is necessary lest the reader be led astray. Not every negligent act or
omission of a covered employee constitutes a failure faithfully to perform that employee's
duties. However, for purposes of the analysis of the suretyship implications, it is not neces-
sary to enter the vast wasteland wherein such issues are located.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 14(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
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An example of such a case could arise when a business entity
files the appropriate forms for a search for UCC-1 financing state-
ments with a secretary of state's office and a bribed state employee
dishonestly fails to disclose the existence of a superior security in-
terest in the property on which the requestor intends to rely for
security for a loan. Assuming governmental immunity problems do
not arise, the party who is injured, having made the loan, may have
a cause of action against that department of the state government
when it discovers that the report received from the secretary of
state's office was erroneous. The bond would provide protection for
the loss to the department, as a co-obligee with the damaged mem-
ber of the general public. Theoretically, the secondary obligor
would then have the same action against the employee (principal
obligor) as would the public body.
As a practical matter and in the real world, such subrogation
rights are rarely pursued. More often than not, such employees are
practically (though perhaps not technically) judgmentproof.42 One
difference between an insurance policy and a surety bond is that
the insurance coverage is triggered by a covered occurrence or acci-
dent whereas coverage under the bond for the obligee is triggered
by dishonesty or lack of faithful performance (depending on the
terms of the instrument) of the bonded employment contract or
the duties of the office (or sometimes both) that causes a loss to
the obligee.
B. Specific Issues Arising in Claims on Public Official Bonds
There are a number of unique perspectives as to the nature of
the obligation and the types of claims that arise under public offi-
cial bonds, blanket employee bonds, and the like. This Article is
not designed to be a primer on public official bonds. Rather, it re-
lates only to those aspects of such bonds that may be significant in
testing the current text of the Restatement of Suretyship.
In the case of a true public official bond on either a named indi-
vidual or a specific office, the public official knows of the existence
42. George R. Veal, Subrogation-The Duties and Obligations of the Insured and Rights
of the Insurer Revisited, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Tort
and Insurance Practice, Fidelity and Surety Law Committee 19 (Aug. 11, 1991) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
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of the surety and often is a signatory on the bond.43 However, in
the case of some public official bonds that are broader in coverage
or blanket public employee bonds, there may be individuals who
have no relationship to and, indeed, no knowledge of the contract
that created the obligation flowing from the secondary obligor to
the obligee." This issue also may arise in financial institution
bonds and commercial fidelity coverages. The current Restatement
draft clearly does not require the principal obligor's knowledge of
the existence of the bond as a prerequisite to a surety rela-
tionship.45
The importance of conferring suretyship status on the issuer of
the bond is that, if suretyship status exists, then the secondary ob-
ligor will have certain rights that might not otherwise be available.
Subsection 1(1) of the Restatement points out that the rights of
the secondary obligor against the principal include those that exist
as a result of the written contract plus those that arise out of sure-
tyship status.4 The rights and duties inherent in suretyship status
vis-A-vis the principal obligor include: 1) the right to require en-
forcement of the principal obligor's duty of performance (which is
also termed "exoneration"); 47 2) the duty of the principal obligor
to reimburse the secondary obligor for the costs of its performance
("reimbursement");4 and 3) the right of the secondary obligor to
be subrogated to the rights of the obligee. e
Claims on public official bonds may arise out of a variety of cir-
cumstances. However, the following six enumerated circumstances
43. See supra text accompanying note 31.
44. See supra text accompanying note 34.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § l(2)(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1); supra note 39
and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. I (Tent.
Draft No. 1) ("The secondary obligor may undertake its obligation as a result of direct
dealings with the obligee without the consent or knowledge of the principal obligor.") (em-
phasis added); id. reporter's note, cmt. 1 (same).
46. See id. § 1(1).
47. Id. § 14(2)(a); see id. § 17. Note that although suretyship status is conferred when
there is no knowledge on the part of the principal obligor, the normal suretyship right of
exoneration does not exist in such a circumstance. See id. § 17(l) (requiring notice by the
principal obligor of the secondary obligation).
48. Id. § 14(2)(b); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 18-20 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1993).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 14(2)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1); see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 23-24 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
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would cover the vast majority of the cases: 1) embezzlement or
misuse of funds by the public official or public employee; 50 2) liti-
gation commenced by either a governmental entity or the taxpay-
ers against an official for failure to follow statutes, regulations, or
the directions of superior officials in the disbursement or deposit of
public funds;5' 3) claims against peace officers for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and the like, including claims for violations of civil
rights in connection with the performance of a peace officer's
duty; 2 4) suits against sheriffs and other public-official process
servers arising out of the failure to serve process properly;53 5)
claims against notaries or comparable officers for negligence or dis-
honesty in the execution of the acknowledgment, or of other docu-
ments generated by such officials;54 and 6) failure faithfully to per-
form a specified duty of the office which leads to damage either to
the public entity or to a member of the general public who is pro-
tected under the specific terms of the statute requiring the bond or
the terms of the bond.55
It is important to remember that the public official bond covers
only acts the official performed while carrying out the duties of the
office and those that he should have performed in carrying out the
duties but failed to do.56 Thus, in effect, the bond only applies
when the public official, such as a sheriff, is acting as a sheriff and
not to any act or omission committed by such individual as an in-
dividual. As might be expected, a number of cases have arisen out
of disputes as to whether a given act was committed in the official
capacity of the bonded public official.57
50. See Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.10.
51. See id.
52. See id. §§ 10.10, 10.17.
53. See id. § 10.10.
54. See id. §§ 10.10, 10.17, 10.26.
55. See, e.g., Valdez v. Gonzales, 176 P.2d 173, 185-86 (N.M. 1946); Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Concerned Taxpayers of Lee County, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
56. See Keech et al., supra note 10, § 10.11.
57. See, e.g., Taylor v. Shields, 210 S.W. 168, 170 (Ky. Ct. App. 1919) (holding a surety
not liable for the acts of a police officer who arrested the plaintiff without a warrant and
assaulted him, because the police officer was not acting in his official capacity); Town of
Clayton v. Wall, 8 S.E.2d 223, 224 (N.C. 1940) (holding that the unlawful arrest and impris-
onment of an alleged tax delinquent by a tax collector did not constitute an act within scope
of his authority).
1993] 1259
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The philosophical basis for the principle limiting liability to offi-
cial acts or omissions clearly supports the view that the arrange-
ment is a suretyship arrangement. The underlying premise of a
suretyship arrangement is that the secondary obligor agrees to
stand behind the performance of an underlying obligation which is
a duty.58 In the case of public official bonds, the duties are those
imposed on the public official by virtue of the office, or in the case
of a public employee bond, by virtue of holding public em-
ployment.
Furthermore, as the Restatement observes in subsection 13(2),
although the duties between the secondary obligor and the obligee
arise out of or exist "pursuant to the contract creating the second-
ary obligation," the duties and rights are also subject to defenses
that arise out of suretyship status. 59 Thus, a secondary obligor on a
fidelity instrument that is clothed with suretyship status is entitled
to all of the usual defenses. As set forth in section 15, these de-
fenses against the obligee may include: 1) discharge of the underly-
ing obligation by the principal obligor's performance or other satis-
faction;"0 2) availability to the secondary obligor of defenses the
principle obligor may possess against the underlying obligation;61
3) the obligee's unreasonable refusal of the principal obligor's ten-
dered performance; 62 or 4) the secondary obligor's possession of a
"suretyship defense."63
In general, suretyship defenses-impairment of recourse, 4 pres-
ervation of recourse, 5 release of underlying obligation,66 and im-
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. 6 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
59. Id. § 13(2). Often when corporate sureties write bonds in a face-to-face relationship, a
separate contract of indemnity is formed between the principal obligor and the secondary
obligor. Scott Leo & George W. Thomas, Surety's Right to Salvage, in HANDLING FIDELITY
CLAIMS, supra note 4, § 8.1, §§ 8.1-.3; N. Rosie Rosenbaum, Fidelity Guaranty Insurance,
in HANDLING FIDELITY CLAIMS, supra note 4, § 11.1, § 11.18. These contracts give the sec-
ondary obligor an arsenal of specific rights and impose significant duties on the principal
obligor. Leo & Thomas, supra, §§ 8.1-.3; Rosenbaum, supra, § 11.18. However, these docu-
ments are relatively unusual in the field of public official bonds except when a bond is is-
sued on a particular individual who occupies a particular office.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 15(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
61. Id. § 15(b).
62. Id. § 15(c).
63. Id. § 15(d).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
65. Id. § 34.
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pairment of collateral 67 -might arise occasionally in disputes on fi-
'delity instruments. The other suretyship defenses enumerated in
the Restatement68 do not tend to arise in fidelity cases.
In certain states, the secondary obligor on a public official bond
has'the ability to seek to terminate the relationship before the ex-
piration of the official's term of office.6 9 These statutes allow a
surety on a public official bond to file a petition with a court of
competent jurisdiction and have the petition served on the institu-
tion.70 The public official must appear before the court within the
prescribed time and file a new bond. 1 In such a case, the previous
bond will still cover acts for which the public official is liable up to
the date of termination. 2 If the public official does not provide
substitute coverage within the specific period of time, the public
official forfeits the office .7  Not surprisingly, the decision of a
surety to exercise such a right can lead to some very nasty and
complicated legal problems, particularly if the public official is un-
able to secure the substitute bond. This ability to terminate a sure-
tyship relationship mid-stream and without cause is relatively un-
usual in suretyship contracts.
III. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS
A. Background
Professional sureties have issued a number of types of financial
institution bonds over the years.. For many years, there were sepa-
rate bonds, often containing very similar clauses, issued on banks,
brokerage houses, savings and loan institutions, and the like. The
66. Id. § 35.
67. Id. § 38.
68. See id. §§ 36-37, 39-41 (discussing the suretyship defenses of extension of time, modi-
fication of underlying obligation, other impairment of recourse, tender of performance, and
obligee's nondisclosure of events giving secondary obligor power to terminate secondary ob-
ligation, respectively).
69. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-4-4-8 (West 1989).
70. See, e.g., id.
71. See, e.g., id.
72. See id. § 5-4-4-13.
73. Id. § 5-4-4-10.
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first so-called bankers blanket bond was issued in 1916. 4 Such
bond forms were changed from time to time. 5 In the early 1980s,
courts had a tendency to seize upon the term "blanket" in the
bankers blanket bond to suggest broader coverage than the text of
the bond purported to convey."6 So the name was changed to "fi-
nancial institution bond" with the revision of Form No. 24 in
1986.1 With respect to issues in the Restatement, the suretyship
principles applicable to the bonds issued to banks will not vary
significantly from those principles applicable to other instruments
on other financial institutions, such as brokerage houses.
The current Form No. 24 financial institution bond is clearly an
insurance policy. The individual coverages are captioned "Insuring
Agreements '7 8 and consist of: "Fidelity" coverage (Insuring Agree-
ment A), which is designed to cover dishonest acts of employees as
defined in the coverage; 9 "On Premises" coverage (Insuring Agree-
ment B), designed to cover loss of property under a variety of cir-
cumstances-including robbery, burglary, and false pretenses-
which occur within the offices of the insured;s0 "In Transit" cover-
age (Insuring Agreement C), which insures against various forms
of loss of property-robbery, larceny, theft, mysterious and unex-
plained disappearance, and the like-while it is in transfer or while
in the custody of certain enumerated agencies or employees acting
for the insured;8 ' "Forgery or Alteration" coverage (Insuring
Agreement D), which covers losses resulting from forgery or altera-
tion as defined in the coverage;8 2 "Securities" coverage (Insuring
Agreement E), which covers losses resulting from acquiring or giv-
74. See Robin V. Weldy, History of the Bankers Blanket Bond with Comments on the
Drafting Process, in ANNOTATED BANKERS BLANKET BOND 5, 5 (Frank L. Skillern, Jr. ed.,
1980).
75. See id. at 5-7.
76. See Robin V. Weldy, History of the Bankers Blanket Bond and the Financial Insti-
tution Bond Standard Form No. 24 with Comments on the Drafting Process, in ANNOTATED
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND (FORMERLY BANKERS BLANKET BOND) 3, 6 (Harvey C. Koch ed.,
2d Supp. 1988) [hereinafter ANNOTATED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND].
77. See id.
78. Financial Institution Bond, Standard Form No. 24 (1986), reprinted in ANNOTATED
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND, supra note 76, app. at 90, 91-92 [hereinafter Form No. 24].
79. See id. § A, at 91.
80. See id. § B, at 92.
81. See id. § C, at 92.
82. See id. § D, at 93.
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ing value on original securities as defined in the coverage, under
circumstances in which the bank had actual physical possession
and relied upon the genuineness of the security; 3 and, last, "Coun-
terfeit Currency" coverage (Insuring Agreement F), which covers
losses sustained as a result of the receipt of counterfeit currency. 4
As can be seen, in none of the coverages except Insuring Agree-
ment A is a contract relationship between the bank (obligee) and
the party causing the loss (principal obligor) an essential element
to coverage.8 5 Under the other coverages, the parties causing the
loss to the bank need not have a contract with the bank as the
basis for exposure. Coverage is triggered not because the carrier is
agreeing to be responsible for the performance of a contract obliga-
tion of another, but because of an event causing loss to the bank
that is otherwise insurable.
B. Insuring Agreement A-Employee Dishonesty
Insuring Agreement A does postulate a situation involving a con-
tract obligation. In addition to the usual duties inherent in the
contract of employment, the agreement contains considerably
greater duties because of banking regulations and a variety of stat-
utes.8 If the obligation not to be dishonest as defined in the bond
is breached so as to cause a loss to the bank, the carrier (secondary
obligor) agrees to cover.8 7 In such a case, all of the normal indicia
of a surety relationship as defined in the Restatement of Surety-
ship are present.8
We have already seen in the case of public employee blanket
bonds that such bonds are defined as creating a surety relationship
83. See id. § E, at 93-94.
84. See id. § F, at 94.
85. Compare id. § A, at 91-92 with id. §§ B-F, at 92-94.
86. Some of the statutes include: 18 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. II 1990) (receipt of gifts or com-
missions for procuring loans); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 656 (Supp. H 1990) (theft, embezzlement, or misap-
plication by bank officer or employee); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (statements or entries gener-
ally); 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Supp. II 1990) (bank entries, reports, and transactions); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014 (Supp. II 1990) (loan and credit applications generally, renewals and discounts, crop
insurance); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. II 1990) (frauds and swindles).
87. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § A, at 91-92.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992); supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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under the draft Restatement.89 However, because of the principal
obligor's lack of notice of the secondary obligation, the usual rights
and remedies of suretyship may be somewhat diminished, particu-
larly in the area of exoneration, which requires notice by the prin-
cipal obligor of the secondary obligation." Exoneration as defined
in section 17 of the Restatement creates two duties that the princi-
pal obligor owes to the secondary obligor. The first is to perform
the underlying obligation.9 The second is to refrain from conduct
that impairs the reasonable expectation of the secondary obligor
that the principal obligor will honor its duty of performance.2 An
advantage of the existence of the right of exoneration is its provi-
sion for full reimbursement for all damages sustained by the sec-
ondary obligor.9' This includes recovery of some damages, such as
attorneys' fees incurred by the secondary obligor in performing the
secondary obligation, that usually are not recoverable by exercise
of the right of reimbursement.9 4
Furthermore, the existence of the right of exoneration may give
rise to the exercise of an action in quia timet. 95 Quia timet is an
extraordinary remedy designed to allow prejudgment exercise of
control or dominion over conduct, property, or assets of the princi-
pal obligor in order to protect the secondary obligor. 96 It may in-
clude a grant of injunctive relief.917 The instruments of indemnity
traditionally executed in favor of the secondary obligor by the
principal obligor usually confer rights comparable to and more ex-
tensive than those provided through quia timet.
As a practical matter, the manner in which claims arise under
Insuring Agreement A in financial institution bonds does not nor-
mally lend itself to an exercise of the rights of exoneration. It is a
89. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 17(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1); see supra note 47.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 17(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
92. See id. § 17(1)(b).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 19(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
94. See id. § 19 cmt. a. However, the secondary obligor may not recover attorneys' fees
incurred while enforcing the principal obligor's duty of reimbursement. Id.
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 17 cmt. j (Tent. Draft No. 1).
96. See id. cmt. j & reporter's note, cmt. j. (quoting Borey v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
934 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1991)).
97. See Borey, 934 F.2d at 33 (holding that a preliminary injunction was warranted to
maintain the status quo and prevent dissipation of the principal's funds).
1264 [Vol. 34:1249
FIDELITY BONDS AND THE RESTATEMENT
rare case in which the damage is not already done by the time the
secondary obligor is called upon to perform under its bond. Thus,
conceptually, the financial institution bond is an insurance policy
in which only one of the major coverages afforded to the insured is
a contract of suretyship. There is nothing unique in this. Many
credit-enhancement contracts contain extensive obligations, with
only a small portion of the relationship possessing the criteria nec-
essary to create a surety relationship.98
C. Specific Issues Arising in Claims on Financial
Institution Bonds
Probably one of the most litigated issues under financial institu-
tion bonds and the previous bankers blanket bonds is what consti-
tutes a "dishonest" act affording coverage to the obligee.9 s For
many years, there was no definition or contractual distinction as to
what was meant by the covered "dishonest or fraudulent act."'100
For example, the 1969 edition of Bankers Blanket Bond Standard
Form No. 24 stated that it would cover
loss through any dishonest or fraudulent act of any of the Em-
ployees, committed anywhere and whether committed alone or
in collusion with others, including loss, through any such act of
any of the Employees, of Property held by the Insured for any
purpose or in any capacity and whether so held gratuitously or
not and whether or not the Insured is liable therefor. 01
This language led to a series of adverse decisions for insurers in
which what the insurer regarded as negligence, slightly tainted, be-
98. For an example of a credit-enhancement contract, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP § 1 illus. 15 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
99. See, e.g., Eglin Nat'l Bank v. Home Indemnity Co., 583 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that willfulness and intent to deceive are necessary elements for acts to be dishonest
and fraudulent); First Nat'l Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1975)
(defining action where an employee creates a conflict of interest and acts in his own interest
or acts in disregard of his employer's interest as dishonest and fraudulent conduct).
100. Not until 1976 when the bonding industry issued a rider defining dishonesty, which
was later incorporated into the body of the 1980 edition of Standard Form No. 24, did the
Bankers Blanket Bond contain a definition of a "dishonest or fraudulent act." See ANNO-
TATED BANKERS BLANKET BOND, supra note 74, at 53-54.
101. Bankers Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 24 § A (1969), reprinted in ANNOTATED
BANKERS BLANKET BOND, supra note 74, app. at 211, 212.
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came "dishonesty.' ' 1°2 For example, some cases involved loans that
violated certain lending policies but were not "dishonest," as that
word is defined conventionally.0 3 One case that particularly embit-
tered the corporate sureties was Mortgage Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.10 4 In this case, an overworked employee of a bank was
found to be "dishonest," thus bringing him within the bond's cov-
erage even though the insurance carrier felt the circumstances in-
volved only negligence, incompetence, or dereliction of duty. 0 5 A
task of the employee was to inspect construction sites to determine
whether the construction was far enough along to justify the per-
centage of construction draw upon which the bank was being asked
to make loans secured by contract proceeds. 0 6 Because the inspec-
tor had more construction sites to visit than he had time to in-
spect, he did not visit a number of the sites; however he made out
reports indicating that he had inspected the sites when he had
not. 0
7
What happened will certainly be of interest to lawyers. The
surety companies began to incur losses from claims which were ad-
versely decided involving situations similar to the Mortgage Com-
pany case.108 Discussions were held between the Surety Association
and the American Bankers Association.'" After those discussions,
what is generally described as the "manifest intent" definition of
102. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1935) (ruling that a
broad definition of dishonesty should be adopted, which could include dishonesty, negli-
gence, or utter imcompetence).
103. See, e.g., Miami Nat'l Bank v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 314 F. Supp. 858 (S.D. Fla.
1970) (ruling that the insured's vice president's allowing a borrower to exceed authorized
and statutory loan limits was fraudulent and dishonest).
104. 115 A.2d 43 (N.J. 1955).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Id.
108. Robin V. Weldy, A Survey of Recent Changes in Financial Institution Bonds, 12
FORUM 270 (1974).
109. The discussions between the American Bankers Association and the Surety Associa-
tion of America and the role such discussions had in forming the language of financial insi-
tution bonds is discussed generally in Weldy, supra note 74, at 5; Weldy supra note 76, at 3-
4. See also Sharp v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 858 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1988);
Calcasieu-Marine Nat'l Bank v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 290, 295 n.6 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); cf. Larry D. Dingus & Peter C. Haley, The Doctrine
of Contra Preferentem in Fidelity Coverage Cases, 10 FORUM 75, 76-82 (1974).
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dishonesty was developed.110 This definition first appeared in en-
dorsements to a variety of fidelity contracts."' It was then incorpo-
rated into the 1980 revision of Bankers Blanket Bond Standard
Form No. 24. The key language under Insuring Agreement A was:
Dishonest or fraudulent acts as used in this Insuring Agreement
shall mean only dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by such
Employee with the manifest intent
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such a loss, and
(b) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee or for any other
person or organization intended by the Employee to receive
such benefit, other than salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses,
promotions, awards, profit sharing pensions or other em-
ployee benefits earned in the normal course of em-
ployment." 2
This Article is not designed to provide a detailed examination or
analysis of this very complex and interesting subject. There are
many cases under the varied definitions of what is a covered "dis-
honest or fraudulent" act or omission."' But for purposes of ana-
lyzing the suretyship aspects of such bonds, the fact that the sec-
ondary obligor has carved out responsibilities for only a portion of
the contractual obligations of the principal obligor is of considera-
ble interest. This is probably quite different from most surety in-
struments in which the contract or duty owed from the principal
obligor to the obligee (the underlying obligation) is covered, if not
in full, in large measure, by the instrument of suretyship issued by
the secondary obligor. From the first bankers blanket bond form,
the obligation assumed by the secondary obligor was less than the
totality of contractual duties owed by the bank employee to the
bank." 4 These later changes emphasize that reality.
110. "Manifest intent" refers to the first words of the new definition, and may be defined
as an obvious or apparent intent to cause the insured to sustain the loss. Frank L. Skillern,
Jr., Fidelity Coverage-What Is Dishonesty?, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS BLANKET BONDS 23, 40-41 (Frank L. Skillern, Jr. ed., 1979).
111. Id. at 39.
112. Bankers Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 24 § A (1980), reprinted in ANNOTATED
BANKERS BLANKET BOND, supra note 74, app. at 192, 193.
113. See, e.g., Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1981); World Exch. Bank v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 173 N.E. 902 (N.Y. 1930).
114. Weldy, supra note 74, at 6.
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Many of the problems that arose in cases between banks and
bonding companies on these instruments were not completely
solved by the 1980 amendment. In 1986, the financial institution
bond was issued containing what might be described as "fine tun-
ing" of these and other issues.' 15 Ultimately, the surety companies
tried to achieve an instrument that provided coverage for those
acts that they felt they intended to cover. Certainly they intended
to cover more than employee embezzlement. However, sureties felt
that those kinds of bank problems involving deliberate breaches of
banking regulations did not, in and of themselves, rise to the level
of the type of act or omission the sureties believed should be insur-
able. 1 6 One of the purposes for departing from the long-used
phrase "bankers blanket bond" was the fact that some courts, in
the ever-expanding desire to find insurance coverage where none
existed, seized on the word "blanket" to suggest that contract lan-
guage should be expanded beyonid its usual meaning.117
Most significant fidelity claims on financial institution bonds in-
volve nonpayment of loans. One of the exclusions in such bonds is
that the bank cannot recover for nonpayment of a loan except in
the case of employee dishonesty (Insuring Agreement A)1 8 or
under the coverages afforded under Insuring Agreements D (for-
gery or alteration)"' and E (securities). 20 Because the circum-
stances regarding the acts or omissions of the employees were often
ambiguous, the following language was added in the 1986 revision
of the Financial Institution Bond:
However, if some or all of the Insured's loss results directly or
indirectly from Loans, that portion of the loss is not covered un-
less the Employee was in collusion with one or more parties to
the transactions and as received, in connection therewith, a fi-
nancial benefit with a value of at least $2,500. 2'
115. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § A, at 91-92.
116. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir.
1991) (providing an example of a surety taking such a position).
117. Weldy, supra note 76, at 6.
118. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § A, at 91-92.
119. See id. § D, at 93.
120. See id. § E, at 93-94.
121. Id. § A, at 91-92.
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This is followed by language consistent with the earlier 1980 lan-
guage: "As used throughout this Insuring Agreement, financial
benefit does not include any employee benefits earned in the nor-
mal course of employment, including: salaries, commissions, fees,
bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing or pensions. ' ' 122 Thus,
there is an even narrower interpretation of the coverage to be af-
forded under this particular instrument of suretyship for nonpay-
ment of loans. In general, those cases decided subsequent to the
issuance of this bond form have largely enforced the language in
accordance with the apparent general intention of the surety in-
dustry. 23 Again, the area of interest to those looking at the surety
relationship as a concept is the fact that this particular surety rela-
tionship is carefully structured to carve out only a very small part
of the duties owed to the obligee by the principal obligor, and to
condition that liability in very specific terms. In this sense, this
type of fiduciary coverage may be relatively unique in the realm of
suretyship.
The financial pressures leading to the drafting of the "manifest
intent" language was not confined to the American insurance mar-
ket. About the time endorsements containing that language were
being adopted in the United States, the 1977 Lloyds' Bankers Pol-
icy issued by Lloyds' of London provided an insuring clause for
"infidelity of employees" as follows:
By reason of and solely and directly caused by one or more dis-
honest or fraudulent acts of any of the Employees of the As-
sured, which are committed with the manifest intent of making,
and which result in, improper personal financial gain for them-
selves wherever committed and whether committed along or in'
collusion with others .... 124
That language also excludes consideration of "[s]alary, fees" as a
personal benefit. 2 5 This particular language is somewhat more re-
strictive than that in. Financial Institution Bond Standard
Form No. 24 because it requires benefit to the dishonest employee
and is not satisfied by intent to provide a benefit to someone else.
122. Id. at 92.
123. See, e.g., FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991).
124. LLOYD'S OF LONDON, LLOYD'S BANKER'S POLICY, FORM LBP, Insuring Clause 1 (1977).
125. Id.
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There is a theoretical question of whether the bond confers the
right of exoneration. Under the current text of the Restatement of
Suretyship, that right is conditioned on whether the principal obli-
gor (bank employee) is charged with notice of the secondary obli-
gation (the existence of the surety bond).'26 This author is unaware
of any cases on this particular subject. In the practical world of
fidelity and surety claims, it is not likely to arise because, as has
been mentioned, normally all of the dust has settled, the loss has
occurred, and the employee is usually gone (often under indict-
ment) before the surety knows about it. 127 The right of exoneration
is essentially legal preventive medicine. The right could be of some
value if the surety sustains losses beyond those covered by the
right of reimbursement and the principal obligor is financially re-
sponsible to cover reimbursement and these other damages as well.
One could argue that any bank employee could be charged with
the knowledge that all banks are required by statute or regulation
(or both) to have a financial institution bond or its functional
equivalent. Once employees are charged with that knowledge, it
would not require a leap of reason also to charge the employee
with knowledge that among those coverages are coverages for em-
ployee dishonesty. If so, exoneration may be available.
The problem with this is that neither section 16 of the Restate-
ment nor the comments thereto ever speaks in terms of "actual"
notice. Rather, the section offers three criteria for a "charged" no-
tice. The first is that the secondary obligation (bond) is entered
into pursuant to the principal obligor's (employee's) assent, re-
quest, or agreement.'28 This is clearly not the case in a financial
institution bond. The second criteria is that the principal obligor
had notice before entering into the underlying obligation (the con-
tract of employment) and that the existence of the secondary obli-
gation was a condition of the obligee's decision to enter into the
contract of employment. 129 The financial institution bond is usu-
ally in existence throughout. The employment of any particular-in-
dividual automatically provides coverage absent a specific exclu-
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 16 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
127. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 16(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
129. Id. § 16(b).
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sion or termination of coverage because of knowledge of prior
dishonesty. 30 Therefore, it would seem the second criterion does
not apply either. Finally, the third criterion is that the principal
obligor assumed the duty of the secondary obligor.'' This clearly
does not apply to financial institution bonds. A question arises as
to whether the current draft intends to operate only in those three
circumstances.
Normally, chargeable knowledge is knowledge assumed from cer-
tain circumstances, whether or not actual knowledge is proven. It
is not clear whether the current drafters of the Restatement have
considered whether actual knowledge or implied-in-fact knowledge
will meet the test to allow the right of exoneration.
Although not directly germane to the purpose of this Article, a
few brief words on the contractual requirements and processing of
fidelity claims under a financial institution bond may assist the
reader in evaluating the relationship. There is a wealth of case au-
thority concerning the rights, duties, and practices in these ar-
eas. 132 Such bonds generally are written for a term of one year.133
Coverage under the bond is triggered by discovery of a "loss"
within the year of coverage."" Such bonds may cover certain losses
resulting from acts or omissions that occurred during the period of
a prior bond, as long as the act or omission is discovered during
the present bond's term; the bond usually covers these losses even
if no coverage was afforded under the prior bond.135
The insured has a notice-of-loss requirement-normally, as soon
as "practicable," but no later than thirty days from discovery. 136
Many claims involve litigation over whether those notice require-
ments have been met.137 The obligation to notify arises after the
130. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 16(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1).
132. See, e.g., Perkins v. Clinton State Bank, 593 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1979); Calcasieu-
Marine Nat'l Bank v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
133. Weldy, supra note 76, at 6.
134. See Videlock & Fletman, supra note 8, § 1.14.
135. See id.
136. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 5(a), at 102.
137. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 160, 163 (1898); Lafayette Bank &
Trust Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 411 A.2d 937 (Conn. 1979).
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insured has discovered a loss covered by the bond."" Such discov-
ery occurs when either the insured knows of an act or omission of
the type covered under the bond, which caused a loss, or the in-
sured has knowledge that gives rise to a duty to investigate, and
the investigation would have provided such a discovery. 39 The in-
sured need not understand the full scope of the loss or have all of
the details for "discovery" to occur.
14
Most, but not all, states give the surety the benefit of a defense
based on late notice only if prejudice has been shown.14 ' In such
states, often there is a period after which the failure to give notice
is considered a violation of the contract as a matter of law.142 In
some instances, this becomes an absolute defense.14 3 In other in-
stances, it merely shifts the burden of proof on the issue of
prejudice from the surety to the obligee.144 The courts determine
whether a notice defense does or does not require prejudice by de-
termining whether the notice requirement is a condition precedent
under the bond or a condition subsequent. 145 If it is a condition
precedent, then generally (though not always), prejudice need not
be shown. If it is a condition subsequent, prejudice does need to be
shown. As a generality, sureties on financial institution bonds do
not win late notice cases unless the circumstances are aggravated
or the prejudice (where required) is clear.'46 However, even in con-
138. See Videlock & Fletman, supra note 8, § 1.15.
139. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 3, at 101.
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Muncie Banking Co. v. American Sur. Co., 200 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1952)
(applying Indiana law); Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 234 Cal. Rptr.
835 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538
A.2d 219 (Conn. 1988); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 719 P.2d 756 (Kan. Ct. App.), review
denied, 239 Kan. 693 (1986); see also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 748
F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the surety need not show prejudice).
142. See generally Annotation, Effect of Failure to Give Notice, or Delay in Giving No-
tice or Filing Proof of Loss, upon Fidelity Bond or Insurance, 23 A.L.R.2D 1065 (1952).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Courts usually look to the terminology of the bond to determine whether compliance
is a condition precedent to recovery. William H. Woods, Conditions to Recovery: Notice,
Proof of Loss and Timeliness of Filing Suit, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
BLANKET BONDS, supra note 110, at 391, 409.
146. E.g., United States v. United Bonding Co., 422 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying
Florida law); Hartford Accident & Immunity Co. v. Hattiesburg Hardware Stores, 49 So. 2d
813 (Miss. 1951).
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dition precedent states where prejudice need not be shown, if pro-
visions of the bond regarding the circumstances when notice must
be given are ambiguous, the issue of fact is usually resolved against
the insurer. 4 7 Looking at this matter from a result standpoint, the
more likely result is that some effort may be made to provide some
pro tanto reduction in the surety's liability by virtue of the cir-
cumstances which surround the late notice.
The bank then has an obligation to file a sworn proof of loss
containing details of the claim. 48 It also may be obliged to provide
one or more officers or employees for deposition by the surety upon
request.149 The surety has up to sixty days in which to investigate
the loss before responding to the proof. 50 These time limits are
often extended in practice by agreement because of the complex
nature of many such claims.
There is express language in the bond that the bank may not
recover the costs of processing the claim.' 5' However, this costs bar
can become occluded because some costs may be associated with
restoring the records so the bank can continue operations in cases
involving concealment, destruction, or alteration of records. Sepa-
rating costs of restoring the records and costs of processing the
claim can often be difficult.
Most large fidelity claims arise out of the nonpayment of
loans. 52 The majority of disputes involving nonpayment-of-loan
claims center on the issue of whether the bank officer(s) involved
in making the loans intended to cause a loss to the bank.'53 Prior
to 1986, the resolution of those questions often centered on
whether the bank officer had a personal interest in the loans. 4
Currently, the mere fact that one might expect or hope for bo-
147. See John R. Hickisch, Special Provisions of Brokers, Insurance Companies and
Savings and Loan Blanket Bonds, in BANKERS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BLANKET
BONDS, supra note 110, at 510, 513-18.
148. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 5(b), at 102.
149. See id. § 7(d), at 104.
150. See Videlock & Fletman, supra note 8, § 1.17 (citing Form No. 24, supra note 78,
§ 5(d), at 102).
151. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 2(u), at 100.
152. Kenneth E. Lewis, Continuing to Make Questionable Loans to Same Customer as
Constituting Dishonesty, 10 FORUM 115, 117 (1974).
153. Id. at 125.
154. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. People's Bank, 27 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1934).
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nuses, promotion, or the like for making the loans that form the
subject of the claim will not support a finding of the necessary per-
sonal benefit. 155 Rather, in fidelity claims not involving the non-
payment of loans, what must be shown is the "manifest intent"
both to cause the bank such a loss and to confer a benefit on some
specific person, not necessarily the employee. 156 In fidelity claims
involving the nonpayment of loans, under the 1986 language, a
benefit of at least $2,500 to the alleged dishonest employee must
be shown before coverage will be afforded. 157 The issues of what
constitutes a benefit (i.e., whether the loan is dishonest) is often
resolved by examining a complex set of facts and a comprehensive
evaluation of circumstantial evidence surrounding the relationship
between the alleged dishonest bank officer and the borrowers.
In the traditional suretyship claim situation (i.e., the nonpay-
ment of a guaranteed note or the nonperformance of a breached
construction contract), if the obligee releases the principal obligor
from the obligation to pay the note or perform the contract, or
releases it in part, that release operates to the benefit of the
surety. 58 However, this circumstance is not unconditional. Under
the current draft of the Restatement, subsection 35(a) indicates
that when the principal obligor (bank employee) is charged with
notice of the secondary obligation (the bond), the principal obligor
is also released from the corresponding duties of performance and
reimbursement owed to the secondary obligor, unless the release
issued by the obligee (the bank) affects a preservation of the sec-
ondary obligor's recourse.15"
Thus, as is pointed out in comment a, the bank employee, if
aware of the existence of the bond, would expect that a release of
obligation by the employer would release him of any obligation to
indemnify the issuer of the surety bond.16 As a practical matter,
all such cases involve circumstances in which the consideration for
the release is less than the amount of loss the obligee claims
against the secondary obligor. This doctrine is somewhat problem-
155. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § A, at 91-92.
156. Id. at 91.
157. Id. at 91-92.
158. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 122 (1941).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 35(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
160. Id. § 35 cmt. a.
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atic in the case of a financial institution bond. It is not clear from
the case authority, nor would it be clear in every instance, that the
employee entering into the release is aware of the existence of the
surety bond.
More important to the bonding company is what happens with
respect to its obligation if there is a release. The rule for discharge
from unperformed duties is set forth in the Restatement as
follows:
(c) if the secondary obligor is not discharged from its unper-
formed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation by operation
of paragraph (b), the secondary obligor is discharged from those
duties to the extent:
(i) of the value of the consideration for the release;
(ii) that the release of a duty to pay money pursuant to the
underlying obligation would otherwise cause the secondary obli-
gor a loss by increasing the difference between the cost to the
secondary obligor of performing its duties pursuant to the sec-
ondary obligation and the amount recoverable by the secondary
obligor from the principal obligor pursuant to its recourse inci-
dent to suretyship status (§§ 17-27) and
(iii) that the release discharges a duty of the principal obli-
gor other than the payment of money, except to the extent that
the obligee establishes that the discharge of that duty does not
increase the difference between the cost to the secondary obligor
of performing its duties pursuant to the secondary obligation
and the amount recoverable by the secondary obligor pursuant
to its recourse incident to suretyship status (§§ 17-27);
(d) the secondary obligor has a claim against the obligee to
the extent provided in § 33(4).161
In fidelity bonds, it is fairly clear that the value of the considera-
tion for the release will go to the 'surety's benefit, assuming that
money is applied to the same loss. It is not so clear, though, that
the surety is completely discharged merely by the release of the
principal obligor. However, as stated in subparagraph (ii) of sub-
section 35(b), the secondary obligor is discharged if the terms of
the release so state.1
6 2
161. Id. § 35(c)-(d).
162. Id. § 35(b)(ii).
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What usually happens in these cases is a pro tanto release or
discharge measured by the release's adverse effect on the surety.16 3
The litigation on such issues tends to revolve around whether the
bank's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. 16 4 If the
bank acted reasonably, the surety will not be released, although it
may be relieved of a portion of its liability to the extent the obligee
has been paid.16 5
The language of the bond relating to subrogation is instructive.
In section 7 of the "conditions and limitations" portion of the fi-
nancial institution bond, the bank is required, upon request, to
give an assignment of its rights upon payment. 66 Second, the
clause provides for contractual subrogation. 67 Next, a complicated
clause allocates recoveries.'68 This clause allocates the net recovery
first to the bank's losses that would have been covered under the
bond but for the fact that they are in excess of the limits of the
bond. 16 9 This section would benefit the insured for other losses re-
coverable against the uninsured individual or institution. If the in-
surer obtains its full recovery, the balance, if any, goes to reim-
burse the deductible.17 0 The final language in this clause states,
"The Insured shall execute all papers and render assistance to se-
cure to the Underwriter the rights and causes of action provided
for herein. The Insured shall do nothing after discovery of loss to
prejudice such rights or causes of action.'1'
Because of the complex nature of the relationships in a case in
which the surety has declined coverage (for whatever reason), a
number of courts have allowed the bank to release its employee, as
163. Id. § 35 cmt. c; see also id. illus. 4; id. reporter's note, cmt. e.
164. See, e.g., Carney v. Central Nat'l Bank, 450 N.E.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983).
165. Id. at 1036 (holding that when the creditor releases security given to the creditor by
the principal, the surety is released to the extent of the value of the security so impaired);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 35 reporter's note, cmt. e (Tent. Draft No.
2).
166. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 7(a), at 103.
167. Id. § 7(b), at 103 ("In the event of payment under this bond, the Underwriter shall
be subrogated to all of the Insured's rights of recovery therefor against any person or entity
to the extent of such payment.").
168. See id. § 7(c), at 103.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 7(e), at 104.
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long as it does so reasonably.172 The burden of proving that the
release is unreasonable is generally on the bonding company.173
One can see many practical commercial reasons, as well as reasons
of fairness, why courts could reach this conclusion. Some courts,
nonetheless, will reach the opposite conclusion and hold that the
release of the alleged dishonest principal obligor releases the
surety.1
4
We believe these cases are extremely fact sensitive. If the court
decides that what the bank has done is fair or, conversely, that
what the surety is doing is unfair, it will tend to deny the existence
of a release, find that the release is not intended to operate to re-
lease the surety, or create some other legal reason for not giving
the surety relief. This is not to say that the surety will not receive
credit for the actual benefit incurred by reason of the arrangement.
Thus, for example, if the claim is $200,000 (which we will assume
is within the limits), and the bank receives $50,000 net of expenses
as a result of its settlement with the dishonest employee, the claim
is reduced to $150,000.
Conversely, if a court decides that the bank has treated the
surety unfavorably, particularly if there is some evidence that the
surety has been greatly prejudiced, then there is greater likelihood
that the court will find that the release of the principal obligor
releases the secondary obligor. Often in such cases, the bank has
let the dishonest employee "off the hook" and perhaps given up
rights against financially responsible third parties without notice to
the surety and before the surety has been called into the claim. In
such a case, there is greater likelihood that a court may find a re-
lease of the surety. In most cases, if there is a settlement between
the bank and the dishonest employee, the surety could not likely
prove it could have gotten more had the settlement not been made.
There also may be questions when the settlement is'made not with
172. See, e.g., Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 442 F. Supp. 960
(D.N.J. 1977); First Hays Banshares, Inc. v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 769 P.2d 1184 (Kan.
1989).
173. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. London & Overseas Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 496, 497-98 (2d. Cir.
1968).
174. See, e.g., St. Louis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 654 F. Supp.
314, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Security Nat'l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 586 F. Supp. 139, 146
(D. Kan. 1982).
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the dishonest employee who is the principal obligor, but with some
third party. In these cases, the language of the bond itself (as
quoted above),'17 5 rather than principles of suretyship law, likely
will be used to try to resolve these problems.
Measuring our experience against the current text of the Re-
statement of Suretyship and section 35 in particular, the general
principles announced are reasonably consistent with what actually
happens in practice. There could be a great deal of text and sub-
text trying to delineate the various conceivable circumstances. This
delineation is more likely to cause confusion because of omitted
circumstances than the more general language currently employed
in the Restatement.
This is probably not an issue that needs to be addressed further
in the Restatement. The language in the current draft is adequate
to cover bright-line cases, and in my experience, many cases indeed
are bright line. Of course, many are not. The advantage of the cur-
rent system is that the results tend, on the whole, to be fair. The
disadvantage to the present system is the lack of predictability.
Because, philosophically, the Restatement is supposed to be pre-
mised on the law that presently exists, the complexity and fact-
sensitive nature of decisions in this area strongly suggest the more
general language currently used is the better course.
IV. COMMERCIAL FIDELITY POLICIES
A. Background
The availability of blanket bonds to commercial (nonfinancial)
institutions commenced in the mid-1920s. 7 6 A 1926 edition of a
primary commercial blanket bond was supplemented by a blanket
position bond in 1928."' In general, the early commercial blanket
bonds were designed to cover all employees or all of a given class of
employees.7 8 The blanket position bond was more similar to a
public official bond in that it was to cover only certain positions.'"
175. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
176. Robert A. Babcock, History of Fidelity Coverage, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET
BOND ANNOTATED 1, 4 (William F. Haug ed., 1985).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 4-5.
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Furthermore, over time, coverage for "loss caused by unidentified
employees" was incorporated into such bonds. 80 The commercial
blanket bond was in use until 1986, when it was replaced by the so-
called "crime policy" 8 1-not surprisingly, coincidentally with the
adoption of Financial Institution Bond Standard Form No. 24.
In general, blanket crime policies provided insuring agreements
similar to, but not identical to, those provided by financial institu-
tion coverage. The 1980 Blanket Crime Policy form is typical. The
coverages are: "Employee Dishonesty" (Insuring Agreement I);182
"Loss Inside the Premises" coverage (Insuring Agreement II);183
."Loss Outside the Premises" coverage (Insuring Agreement III);184
"Money Orders and Counterfeit Paper Currency" coverage (Insur-
ing Agreement IV);"s5 and "Depositors Forgery" coverage (Insuring
Agreement V).186
Here again, what is issued is an insurance policy. In such poli-
cies, the issuer is referred to as the "insurer" or "the company.
'
"
1 87
The business institution, which in a surety relationship would be
the obligee, is referred to quite simply as the "insured."' 88 Further-
more, as is true in the financial institution bond,8 " none of the
coverages except employee dishonesty coverage contemplates, as a
condition of the coverage, the existence of the contractual relation-
ship between a principal obligor and obligee that is essential to
suretyship. °90
180. Id. at 4.
181. Robert A. Babcock, History of Fidelity Coverage, in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET
BOND ANNOTATED 1, 1 (Carolyn P. Perry ed., 1st Supp. 1991). Prior to that time, there was
another policy often referred to as the "3D Policy," officially encaptioned the "Dishonesty,
Disappearance and Destruction Policy." Babcock, supra note 176, at 5. This policy first
appeared in 1940. Id. Blanket crime policies were also in existence prior to 1986. Babcock,
supra, at 1.
182. Blanket Crime Policy § 1 (1980), reprinted in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND AN-
NOTATED, supra note 176, app. B at 172, 173 [hereinafter Crime Policy].
183. Id. § II, at 173.
184. Id. § III, at 173.
185. Id. § IV, at 173.
186. Id. § V, at 173. Despite the differences in their names and the few differences in the
policies, the basic coverages provided under the 3-D Policy were essentially the same as the
Crime Policy. Babcock, supra note 176, at 5.
187. Crime Policy, supra note 182, at 172.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
190. Compare Crime Policy, supra note 182, § I, at 173 with id. §§ II-V, at 173.
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Nonetheless, using the Restatement definitions of a suretyship
relationship, 1 1 it is clear that a surety relationship does exist with
respect to Insuring Agreement I. There is a contractual relation-
ship between the employer (obligee) and the covered employee
(principal obligor). 92 This employment relationship is the underly-
ing obligation. The performance of that obligation remains primar-
ily with the employee. The contract of employment is breached by
the employee whose dishonesty is an essential predicate for cover-
age under the bond. e3 The surety is made to respond only when
there has been a violation of that obligation by the requisite dis-
honesty as defined in the policy.9
The definition of dishonesty in current forms is the functional
equivalent of and, for the most part, identical to the language used
in financial institution bonds.'95 Dishonest and fraudulent acts
must meet the "manifest intent" test, which requires intent to
cause the insured to sustain such a loss, and intent to obtain finan-
cial benefit for the employee or any other person or organization
(excluding salaries, commissions, and fees as financial benefit). 9 '
B. Specific Aspects of Commercial Fidelity Coverage
Relevant to the Law of Suretyship
Whatever may be the result under the financial institution bond,
normal commercial fidelity coverages do not necessarily charge the
covered employee with knowledge of the existence of the secondary
obligor. Although this does not destroy the existence of a surety
relationship, it does limit the rights available to the surety. From
the standpoint of an employee, normally whether or not the em-
ployer has fidelity coverage is a fortuity. There is certainly no gen-
eral usage in this respect. When the bond does include position
coverage, the situation may be different. There could be commer-
cial enterprises in which an employee must be bondable to obtain a
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
192. See Crime Policy, supra note 182, § I, at 173.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Compare id. (defining "dishonest or fraudulent acts" as requiring "manifest intent"
to cause the loss and obtain a financial benefit) with Form No. 24, supra note 78, § A, at 91-
92 (same).
196. Crime Policy, supra note 182, § I, at 173.
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certain job and, if this is so, arguably the requisite charged knowl-
edge exists.
Such policies generally provide that coverage. which otherwise
would exist (proof of a loss by employee dishonesty) still exists
even though the insured is unable to identify the dishonest em-
ployee. 197 Thus, for example, section 4 of the conditions and limi-
tations of a commercial blanket bond states:
If a loss is alleged to have been caused by the fraud or dishon-
esty of any one or more of the Employees and the Insured shall
be unable to designate the specific Employee or Employees
causing such loss, the Insured shall nevertheless have the benefit
of this Bond, subject to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this
Bond [i.e., the inventory exclusion], provided that the evidence
submitted reasonably proves that the loss was in fact. due to the
fraud or dishonesty of one or more of the said Employees, and
provided, further, that the aggregate liability of the Underwriter
for any such loans shall not exceed the amount stated in Item 3
of the Declarations. 198
This language is in a 1980 commercial blanket bond form. Com-
parable language in the 1990 commercial crime policy states: "Em-
ployee Dishonesty. . .means only dishonest acts committed by an
'employee' whether identified or not, acting alone or in collusion
with other persons, except you or a partner ....
One can argue as a necessary corollary, harkening back to finan-
cial institution bonds, that because no such language appears in a
financial institution bond, the obligee bank must be able to iden-
tify the particular dishonest bank employee who caused the loss.
Coverage that is afforded even though the individual "principal ob-
ligor" cannot be identified is certainly a two-party surety relation-
ship. Determining that a surety relationship exists at all in uniden-
tified employee cases is, perhaps, pushing the envelope.
197. Babcock, supra note 176, at 4.
198. Commercial Blanket Bond § 4 (1980), reprinted in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND
ANNOTATED, supra note 176, app. A at 169, 170.
.199. Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form A-Blanket § D(3)(a) (1990), reprinted in
THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED, supra note 181, app. B at 96, 96 [hereinafter
Employee Dishonesty Form A].
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How can the suretyship defenses, such as release of the principal
obligor, 00 operate when nobody knows who is the principal obli-
gor? Against whom can the surety claim reimbursement or exoner-
ation? 0 1 Thq, ight of subrogation arises by contract and probably
arises by operation of law regardless of whether a surety relation-
ship exists. 202 Thus, it is possible to argue philosophically that the
employee dishonesty coverage in such policies as the crime policy
is further subdivided in that the surety relationship exists only for
the losses caused by an employee or employees who are
identifiable.
Claims on employee dishonesty commercial coverages generally
fall into one of four categories: 1) outright embezzlement or misuse
of money;20 3 2) stealing or assisting in stealing the tangible per-
sonal property of the insured;20 4 3) enabling dishonest outsiders to
secure credit to which they are not otherwise entitled;2 5 or 4) sell-
ing products or services of or to the employer in which the amount
is dishonestly deflated or inflated. 06
In the four areas enumerated above, an issue leading to exten-
sive litigation arises when the insured attempts to establish the ex-
istence or amount of its inventory losses by comparing its profit
and loss information for a "normal period" against the period
when the dishonest employee allegedly caused the loss. 207 A text-
book example of such a case is when the owner of a liquor store
catches an employee stealing $100 worth of liquor. The owner then
presents a claim on the fidelity bond for $40,000 because inventory
records purport to show that $40,000 worth of liquor is missing.
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 35 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
201. See id. § 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 18 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
203. See, e.g., Chenoweth-Chapman Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 553 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
204. See, e.g., Jones v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 432 N.W.2d 535 (Neb. 1988); Ace
Wire & Cable Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 454 N.Y.S.2d 897 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd,
457 N.E.2d 761 (N.Y. 1983).
205. See, e.g., First Am. State Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1990);
American Trust & Say. Bank v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 418 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa
1988).
206. See, e.g., James B. Lansing Sound, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 801 F.2d
1560 (9th Cir. 1986).
207. See, e.g., Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 479 F.2d 1243, 1245
(2d Cir. 1973); Gillette Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 365 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1966).
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This is of interest because it is an area in which the secondary
obligation is limited and not coextensive with the primary obliga-
tion. All such policies contain some version of what is described as
the "Inventory and Profit and Loss" exclusion.208 Such an exclu-
sion might read:
We will not pay for loss as specified below:
b. Inventory Shortages: loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of
which as to its existence or amount is dependent upon:
(1) An inventory computation; or
(2) A profit and loss computation.2 09
In earlier versions of this clause, courts found an ambiguity be-
cause of language stating, "However, this paragraph shall not ap-
ply to loss of .. .property which the insured can prove, through
evidence wholly apart from such computations, is sustained by the
insured .... ."10 Thus, in our textbook case, if the insured could
prove a loss through dishonesty by means other than inventory
computation (such as catching the employee red handed with $100
worth of stolen liquor), the insured could then use an inventory
shortage to attempt to prove the amount of the loss attributable to
dishonesty.
After a long-delayed period of fighting such cases, the insurance
industry removed the offending clause leaving the basic exclusion.
The reasons for these exclusions should be fairly obvious. They re-
late to the determination by the sureties that they do not intend to
cover inventory or operating statement losses simply because
somebody has found a dishonest employee stealing from the
company.
208. Hugh E. Reynolds, Jr. & Deanna L. Seward, Inventory and Profit and Loss, in THE
COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED, supra note 176, at 45, 45.
209. Id.; see, e.g., Commercial Crime Coverage Form 0-Per Loss § D(1)(b) (1990), re-
printed in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKET BOND ANNOTATED, supra note 181, app. D at 99, 99
(containing identical terms).
210. James E. Chelberg, The Inventory Computation Exclusion-The Latest View, 15
FORUM 930, 933 (1980).
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V. RESTATEMENT SECTIONS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO
FIDELITY COVERAGES
Several sections of the Restatement should be examined in a
more general fashion rather than by relating the section to a spe-
cific type of fidelity bond. These will be covered briefly to the ex-
tent they may be of interest.
A. Voiding or Terminating the Secondary Obligation
Section 9 of the Restatement instructs us regarding the circum-
stances making the secondary obligation voidable due to misrepre-
sentation.21' For fidelity coverages in general, a material misrepre-
sentation by the principal obligor does not serve to void or make
voidable the coverage.212 If, however, that misrepresentation is
known to the obligee, or if the obligee is chargeable with such
knowledge, the suretyship contract may be voidable.1 3 Normally,
voidability will occur when the applications are issued and signed
by the obligee in order to procure commercial fidelity policies, fi-
nancial institution bonds, and, more rarely, types of public em-
ployee or public official coverages. In these cases, a material mis-
representation by the applicant-obligee can be a basis for
revocation of the coverage. 21 4 The principles applicable to this cir-
cumstance are not materially different in fidelity coverage than in
other types of surety relationships. The factual difference is that in
most other surety relationships, the application is not made by the
obligee. For example, in performance bonds, the application is usu-
ally made by the primary obligor rather than the obligee.21 5
Most of the cases involving this issue turn upon two separate
fact situations-one renders the coverage voidable ab initio, and
the other terminates coverage upon the existence of a fact that
may or may not predate the coverage. The first of these circum-
stances arices when the obligee knows of prior dishonesty on the
part of a covered employee or officer when making application, or
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 9 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
212. Id. cmt. e.
213. Id. cmt. f.
214. Id. § 9(1).
215. See Carl R. Dickey et al., Performance Bond Claims, in HANDLING FIDELITY CLAIMS,
supra note 4, § 6.1, 6.1.
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when the obligee lies about some material relating to the opera-
tions of the bank or commercial institution. 16 Normally, the appli-
cation will contain specific questions which, if properly answered,
will reveal this information. Because the secondary obligor submits
an application with questions, however, an argument exists that
the provisions of subsection 9(3) of the Restatement, regarding the
duty to disclose facts unknown to the secondary obligor,21 7 may be
merged in the legally justified assumption by the obligee that all
relevant questions have been asked in the application.
A second very specific legal and factual question is common to
financial institution bonds and most, but not all, commercial fidel-
ity coverages. This is the so-called "termination of coverage" upon
discovery of dishonesty. An example of such a provision follows:
This insurance is cancelled as to any "employee":
a. Immediately upon discovery by:
(1) You; or
(2) Any of your partners, officers or directors not in collusion
with the "employee";
of any dishonest act committed by that "employee" whether
before or after becoming employed by you. 218
The current Financial Institution Bond Standard Form No. 24
contains comparable language in section 12 under "termination or
cancellation":
This bond terminates as to any Employee or any partner, officer
or employee of any Processor-(a) as soon as any Insured, or
any director or officer not in collusion with such person, learns
of any dishonest or fraudulent act committed by such person at
any time, whether in the employment of the Insured or other-
wise, whether or not of the type covered under Insuring Agree-
ment (A), against the Insured or any other person or entity,
without prejudice to the loss of any Property then in transit in
the custody of such person .... 19
216. See, e.g., St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 376 F.2d 33, 35 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828 (1967).
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 9(3) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
218. Employee Dishonesty Form A, supra note 199, § D(2)(a), at 96.
219. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 12, at 105.
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The clause goes on to state, in pertinent part: "Termination of
the bond as to any Insured terminates liability for any loss sus-
tained by such Insured which is discovered after the effective date
of such termination. 220
As one can readily see, the broad scope of this particular termi-
nation clause goes far beyond the provisions of section 9 of the
Restatement, which really apply to misrepresentations rather than
knowledge of prior acts or omissions.
B. Assignment of Obligee's Rights
Section 10 of the Restatement covers assignments.221 Subsection
10(1) generally permits assignments of the secondary obligation
absent three enumerated circumstances.222 One of these enumer-
ated circumstances is when the assignment is validly precluded by
contract. Most fidelity policies preclude assignment without con-
sent. Furthermore, many such policies terminate upon the in-
sured's being taken over by a governmental agency such as the
FDIC, going into bankruptcy, or the like.223 Clauses generally in
use would include general phrases such as, "Your rights and duties
under this policy may not be transferred without our written con-
sent except in the case of the death of an individual named
insured. '224
Under the standard rules of bankruptcy law, a general clause
like that quoted above would not terminate the policy automati-
cally upon bankruptcy.2 2 5 Indeed such a result would be invalid
under the bankruptcy laws, whatever the language of the change.226
However, the existence of the bankruptcy should not affect the ter-
mination of coverage as to an individual employee upon discovery
of dishonesty.
This issue arises more often with respect to financial institution
bonds than commercial fidelity coverages. The relevant language in
220. Id.
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 10 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
222. Id. § 10(1).
223. See, e.g., Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 12, at 105.
224. INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL LINES POLICY COMMON POLICY DECLARA-
TIONS, condition F (CPP-6800-A) (Jan. 1987).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (1988).
226. See id.
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a financial institution bond that most often comes into play ap-
pears under section 12, "Termination or Cancellation": "This
bond terminates as an entirety upon occurrence of any of the fol-
lowing: . . . (c) immediately upon the taking over of the Insured
by a receiver or other liquidator or by State or Federal officials, or
(d) immediately upon the taking over of the Insured by another
institution. 221 7 These issues have been fiercely litigated, particu-
larly by federal regulators.22 s In general, this provision has been
upheld 229 although judicial authorities probably will continue to
challenge its applicability. 230 Note that this terminates coverage
only as to the one employee.
C. Right of Set-Off
Section 27 of the Restatement refers to the secondary obligor's
right to return performance and the obligee's right of set-off.231
This may be important in fidelity cases in which an obligation may
be owing from the obligee (the bank) to the principal obligor (the
dishonest employee). If we assume a surety relationship, subsec-
tion 27(2) would seem to disallow a set-off of other obligations
against the right obtained through subrogation to return perform-
ance of a claim against the principal obligor when the claim against
the principal obligor is "unrelated to the underlying obligation. "232
This language approaches, but does not precisely match, the por-
tion of the financial institution bond subrogation section discussed
heretofore.233
A question arises as to whether the specific language of the bond
regarding allocation of recovery proceeds would control. The as-
227. Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 12, at 105.
228. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
1592 (9th Cir., Jan. 31, 1992); California Union Ins. Co.,v. American Diversified Say. Bank,
948 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1991).
229. See, e.g., California Union, 948 F.2d at 563; FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 903
F.2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1990).
230. See, e.g., Eugene J. Comey, Current Issues in FDIC/RTC Financial Institution Bond
Litigation, National Institute of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, Committee on
Fidelity and Surety Law, American Bar Association (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 27 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
232. Id. § 27(2).
233. See Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 7(b), at 103; supra note 165.
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sumption is that it would. However, it is at least arguable under
the language of the current Restatement that the the surety's
rights to recoup could come ahead of the rights of the bank to re-
cover the payment of a personal note of the dishonest employee
owed to the bank from funds held by the bank.
234
D. Third-Party Beneficiaries
I have already remarked that members of the general public
often are third-party beneficiaries under public official bonds.
However, the opposite is the case under most other instruments of
fidelity coverage. Virtually all of the forms of financial institution
bonds or commercial fidelity coverages state something like the fol-
lowing: "This bond shall apply to loss of Property (1) owned by the
Insured, (2) held by the Insured in any capacity, or (3) for which
the Insured is legally liable. This bond shall be for the sole use and
benefit of the Insured named in the Declarations.
23 5
Most often, this language becomes an issue when claimants,
stockholders, or depositors (in the case of a financial institution)
seek an action directly against the bond.236 Absent proof of the re-
quirements for a derivative action (which then makes the action
that of the insured institution), such attempts to recover directly
against the bond are uniformly unsuccessful.2 37
VI. CONCLUSION
On balance, the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship accurately
summarizes the experience of issuing various forms of fidelity cov-
erages and the cases covering disputes arising out of such cover-
ages. On some issues, the law is not clear and the Restatement now
provides solid law on this point. There are some issues, however,
that do arise but which are not covered by the Restatement. In
some of these issues, it is probably just as well the Restatement
does not cover the problem.
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 27(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2).
235. E.g., Form No. 24, supra note 78, § 10, at 104.
236. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Duke, 293 F. 661 (9th Cir. 1923).
237. Id. at 664 (holding that depositors and creditors of a bank cannot maintain suit on a
fidelity bond and that any benefit they may derive must be worked out through the bank).
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By far, the most common area of concern is the reluctance of the
courts to consider that the relationship created by employee dis-
honesty coverage in commercial fidelity policies or financial insti-
tution bonds is, essentially, a surety relationship. A majority of
courts certainly accept that the surety relationship exists. The Re-
statement should assist in directing any court's attention to the
existence of this relationship and a resolution of legal questions
with that relationship and the contract provisions in mind.
